Problems of Copyright Ownership in Works Created byArtificial Intelligence under Thai Law

Abstract

Generative artificial intelligence can now produce literary, artistic,
and musical works of a quality comparable to human-created works. This
article examines the problem of copyright ownership in such works under Thailand's Copyright Act B.E. 2537 (1994), asking whether the definition of
"creator" in Section 4, read together with the originality requirement embedded in Section 6, is broad enough to address the varying degrees to which artificial intelligence may participate in the creative process.
The study finds that Thai law contains no provision directly addressing the role of artificial intelligence, leaving works produced
without meaningful human creative control in an uncertain protective status. Because Thailand's copyright system is automatic and does not
examine a claimant's qualifications as creator, this uncertainty is likely to
surface in infringement litigation rather than at the point of seeking protection, unlike in the United States, where the issue arises through registration refusal. Comparative analysis of the United States, the United
Kingdom, the European Union, and China shows that while every system
declines to recognize artificial intelligence itself as an author, they diverge
on whether prompting and selection by a human user suffices to establish
authorship. The United Kingdom's distinctive Section 9(3) provision is now
under review for likely repeal per the government's 2026 report. The article proposes that Thailand amend Sections 4 and 6 of the Copyright Act to establish clear criteria for authorship where artificial
intelligence is used, centered on meaningful human creative control
rather than the mere entry of a prompt, to balance the promotion of new technology against the protection of genuine human creators.